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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
\\'ESTl~~HX ( 'OXTRACTI~O 
< 'OHPOIL\ TIOX (Employer) 
and 1·~\I:PLOY I·~RS ~[UTUAL 
LL\BII .. rrY INSeHAKCE 
( 
10\l PA~Y OF \VISCONSIN, 
( ( 
1a rril'r), 
Pla!intiff s, 
-\'8.-
IXDFHTRL\L C0:\1:\IISSION OF 
UTAH and LEO . ..A. DAVIS, 
Defenda;nts. 
PETITION 
Case 
No. 9970 
Plaintiffs' 
Petition 
for 
Rehearing 
and 
Brief 
Plaintiff now pl'titions the Court, under Rule 76 (e) 
( l), l~tah Rules of CiYil Procedure, for rehearing of the 
above Pntitled n1atter, initially decided by this Court 
on ~lareh (i, 196-!, and plaintiff cites as error the follow-
ing: 
1. rrhe statement in the decision to the effect 
that the ::-;tatutory aw·ards for permanent disability 
are intended a::; recmnpense for "inconvenience" and 
"pain and suf~ering" is entirely without support 
in thP literature Of rtah COmpensation law, and 
eon~titnt~·~ a change in judicial attitude of such 
~Prion::-; iinplieation that it should not casually be 
adopted as the law of this state. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. The statement in the decision to the effect 
that the Commission had 1nade a finding ("deter-
mination") of total blindness in this case is incorrect; 
and the conclusion of the Commission that the stipu-
lated facts justify an award for total blindness is 
not properly accorded the judicial tribute that it 
must stand unless found to be "arbitrary and capri-
cious." 
3. The statement in the decision to the effect 
that the Legislature, by merely providing a specific 
award for "total blindness", expressed an intention 
that correctible and uncorrectible impairment of 
vision should be demned equally disabling is con-
trary to common sense and conunon understanding. 
Respectfully subnritted. 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By: Frank J. Allen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
BRIEF 
POINT I 
THE STATEMENT IN THE DECISION TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE STATUTORY AWARDS FOR 
PERMANENT DISABILITY ARE INTENDED AS 
RECOMPENSE FOR "INCONVENIENCE" AND 
"PAIN AND SUFFERING" IS ENTIRELY WITH-
OUT SUPPORT IN THE LITERATURE OF UTAH 
COMPENSATION LAW, AND CONSTITUTES A 
CHANGE IN JUDICIAL ATTITUDE OF SUCH 
SERIOUS IMPLICATION THAT IT SHOULD NOT 
CASUALLY BE ADOPTED AS THE LAW OF THIS 
STATE. 
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The fourth paragraph of thL· Decision herein reads 
as follows: 
"'l'he contention that these con1pensation 
awards were created only as compensation for 
loss of bodily functions which reduce earning capa-
city i~ clearly not cotT<'d. Our statute expressly 
provides that the ~dwduled awards for loss of 
bodily parts and functions shall be in addition 
to tlw <'Olnpen~ation provided for temporary total 
<li~ahility. Further, everyone knows that total 
blindness of one eye, if the other eye functions 
properly, usually does not reduce the earning 
eaparity but does crrate great handicap and in-
convenience and often pain and suffering." 
\rith rPferencr to that paragraph, we would assert these 
propositions: 
.A. The position that pern1anent disability compen-
~ation a"·ards are not to be based upon actual 
or theoretical loss of earning capacity is a clear 
departure frmu the traditional view of this Court 
and A1nerican courts in general. 
B. rrlH· fact that pennanent partial disability com-
pensation is payable in addition to temporary 
total disability con1pensation has no relevance 
to the question which here concerns us. 
l'. There is no basis upon which the Court can judi-
cially notice that "total blindness" of one eye 
does not reduce earning capacity. 
'Ye shall dL·velop these propositions separately. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A 
The whole concept of the workmen'8 con1pensation 
movement is that industry should assurne the burden of 
( 1) replacing income lost by workmen while they are 
convalescing from industrial injury ( te1nporary disabil-
ity compensation) and (2) replacing the potential future 
income which it is presumed a workman will have lost 
the opportunity to realize if he sustains, from industrial 
injury, a permanent loss of industrial function (perman-
ent disability compensation). Temporary disability com-
pensation, therefore, compensates for lost earnings; per-
manent disability compensation compensates for lost 
earning capacity. 
It is true that a certain segment of the A1nerican Bar 
has ceaselesly urged judicial acceptance of the idea that 
the compensation acts fix the blame upon the employer 
for all industrial injuries so that a compensation hearing 
is a proceeding upon the issue of damages only. This 
idea has not been accepted. We have, in previous briefs, 
presented the views of Arthur Larson and \Yilliam 
Schneider. We would now refer the Court to the standard 
reference works : 
American Jurisprudence, Volume 58, page 778, 
W orktnen' s Compensation, Section 282. 
"Meaning of 'Incapacity' and 'Disability' in 
General. - The terms 'disability' and 'incapacity' 
as used in workmen's compensation statutes, seem 
to be regarded as practically synonymous. The 
term 'disability,' as so used, ordinarily means 
loss or impairment of earning power, and has 
been held not to mean loss of a member. However, 
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as mwd in sonw statutes, the word 'disability' is 
not restricted to rnere loss of earning power; and 
the mere fact that an injured workman is em-
ployed at the same work and at the sarne wages 
as before the injury will not disentitle hiln to 
compensation under the act, if his physical effi-
ciency has been substantially impaired. • Incapa-
city,' within the rneaning of the statute, may exist 
by reason of inability to procure ernployrnent, as 
well as by reason of incapacity to perform the 
service. In such cases, however, the failure to 
obtain work rnust be because of inability resulting 
directly frorn tht• injury, and not from a depressed 
condition of business, and consequent slackness 
of the demand for labor." 
Corpus Juris Secundun1, V olurne 99, page 61, Work-
men·~ Compensation, Section 13: 
"Except as appears below, cornpensation un-
der the workrnen's compensation acts is based on 
incapacity or disabiilty for work, and hence on 
the loss or impairment of the employee's earning 
capacity in the employment at which he was en-
gaged when injured, the compensation payments 
being in lieu of wages, or based on the loss there-
of, and on the idea of providing means of subsis-
tence to the ernployee during a time when his earn-
ing capacity has been partially or entirely de-
stroyed. 
"Correspondingly, except as appears below, 
compensation is not based on the idea of indem-
nity for physical ailment or impairment as such, 
or compensation for mere disability that does not 
incapacitate, or in the theory of compensation or 
damages for pain and suffering. 
"It has been further said that the law was 
designed to compensate the injured employee for 
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the loss of earning capacity, and not 1nerel~, for 
the loss of earnings." 
This Court itself has frequently rejected the argu-
ment that com1non law dan1ages doctrines should lw 
applied in a c01npensation case. ( ~ee Broder£ck v. Com-
mission, 63 Utah 210, 224, Pac. 876; Spe11cer v. Com-
mission, 87 Utah 336, 40 P .2d 188.) 
In Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Conunision, 
92 Utah 511, 69 P.2d 608, this Court seemed to have 
dispelled any doubt or confusion about its position on 
this question. At page 519 of the Utah Report, this state-
Inent appears: 
"There still seems to be considerable con-
fusion among the bar as to the basis of compensa-
tion. The writer perhaps cannot state it any better 
than it was put in the dissenting opinion in the 
case of Caillet v. Industrial Commission, 90 rtah 
8, 58 P. (2d) 760, at page 763, where it was said: 
'Compensation is payable for disability 
to earn caused by accident in employment. 
T'emporary total disability is founded on ac-
tual disability. Permanent partial is founded 
theoretically on loss of earning ability, but 
is absolute in law whether loss of earning 
ability is actually suffered or not. The law 
presumes the loss of earning power. It is 
presun1ed on loss of bodily function. I an 
arm, or leg, or eye is lost, the employee gets 
compensation even though he earns ten times 
as much as formerly as, for instance, a radio 
announcer. The vocational factor is not an 
element in the loss of bodilv function. Brod-
erick v. Industrial Conunis.~ion. 63 rtah 210, 
224 P. 87'6; Amalgamated Sttgar Co. v. Indus-
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trial Com mission, 7(i r tah 536, 286 P. 959. 
The cmnplt-tl' loss of use vocationally (this 
word should be mnitted) was equivalent to a 
loss of the member because if a rnernber left 
on is no mon• use than a men1ber off, but 
rather an irnpediment, the law treats it as if 
it were off. Broderick v. Industrial Commis-
sion, supra; Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. In-
rlHsfrial Comm,ission, 74 Utah 103, '277 P. 206. 
Any loss of bodily function not provided for 
in the schedule in section 42-1-62, R. S. Utah 
1933, is to be based on 'proportion to the cmn-
pensation in other cases' provided in the 
schedule. That results in the necessity for 
<'vidence on the rernaining function in terms 
of the original or full physical function of 
the member.' " 
The decision of l\Iarch 6th herein contains the first 
statement by this Court out of harmony with the compen-
sation concept as expounded by the authorities above 
quoted. 
There is smne suggestion in the March 6th opinion 
that the Court, in taking this new position, believes it is 
aligning itself with some modern movement in the com-
pensation field. This is a curious delusion when it is 
eonsiderPd that the n1ost recent polemical writing cited 
hy defendant or the Court is a 1947 article by Samuel 
Horovitz, and the rnost recent case cited by defendant is 
a 1943 Colorado case (Jewel Colleries v. Kenda., 110 Colo. 
:~9-!). The idea that compensation should be measured 
by pain, suffering or inconvenience has been sharply 
criticized (see Arthur Larson's comment on page 5 of 
plaintiff's Reply Brief) and has had no regnancy (refer 
again to the excerpts from ~\m. Jur. and C.J.S., supra). 
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All the recent eye cases (plaintiff has already cited 
Yureko v. Prospect Foundry Company, 115 N.W. 2d 477 
(May 11, 1962); Lambert v. Industrial Commission, 104 
N.E. 2d 783 (1962); and Walsh Construction~ Cornpany v. 
London, 80 S.E. 2d 52 4(1962)) adopt the established 
view that permanent disability must be appraised in 
terms of loss of industrial function, i.e., earning capacity. 
B 
The Court's assertion, in the March 6th decision, 
that "'the contention that these compensation awards 
were created only as compensation for loss of bodily 
functions which reduce earning capacity is clearly not 
correct," which seerns to unravel some forty years of 
judicial knitting, is astonishing to say the least, and one 
would expect such an abrupt change of view to be fully 
explained in the decision. All that is offered in the way 
of explanation, however, is the statement that permanent 
disability compensation is payable in addition to tempo-
rary disability compensation, a precept we consider to 
be apodictic but hardly relevant to the question of 
whether permanent disability compensation is payable 
for presumed loss of earning capacity. In Utah, as every-
where, it has always been the policy to wait until an 
injured employee has returned to work (or determined 
to be as ready to return as he is likely to become) before• 
attempting to evaluate his loss of industrial function. 
Obviously the payrnents made to cmnpensate for loss of 
earnings during convalescence are in addition to the pay-
ments made to compensate for loss of earning capacity 
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thereafter. How this fact compels the Court to conclude 
that permanent disability comJwm·mtion is intended to 
l'ompensate for pain, suffering and inconvenience is what 
wt> cannot comprehend. 
c 
In the .March 6th opinion, the Court makes another 
a~tonishing assertion: '"Everybody knows that total blind-
Ill'~~ of one eye'' ... ''does not reduce earning capacity." 
( \•rtainly there wa~ no evidence before the Court on which 
~ueh a finding could be based, and we are forced to sup-
po~P that this is a fact of economic life which the Court 
has judicially noticed. If so, we submit that it is not 
a proper subject for judicial notice. Abundant evidence 
eould be adduced that one-eyed n1en are limited in their 
fields of econmnic activity. No such evidence was at-
h•mpted to be adduced because the Legislature has al-
ready made for us the deternlination that permanent 
visual ilnpainnent reduces earning ability. In the words 
of the Caillet case (supra), "The law presumes the loss 
of earning power. It is presumed on loss of bodily func-
tion. lf an ann, or leg, or eye is lost, the employee gets 
compensation even though he earns ten times as much 
a~ formerly." 
Against the background of Utah's law and the clear 
~tatutory prestunption that the loss of an eye reduces 
earning capacity, it is strange indeed that this Court 
~hould suddenly declare, without evidence, that the con-
trary is true. 
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POIN·T II 
THE STATEMENT IN THE DECISION TO THE 
EFFECT 'THAT THE COMMISSION HAD MADE A 
FINDING <"DETERMINATION") OF T 0 TAL 
BLINDNESS IN THIS CASE IS INCORRECT; AND 
THE CONCLUSION OF THE COMMISSION THAT 
THE STIPULATED FACTS JUSTIFY AN AWARD 
FOR TOTAL BLINDNESS IS NOT PROPERLY AC· 
CORDED THE JUDICIAL TRIBUTE THAT IT MUST 
S'TAND UNLESS FOUND TO BE "ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS.'' 
There have been a great many occasions for this 
Court to remind the Bar that findings of fact made by 
the Commission will not be disturbed if there is any evi-
dence to support them. This policy is in accord, of course, 
with the basic principle of administrative law that the 
administrative agency is best qualified to make fact deter-
minations not only because it receives the evidence and 
can assess the credibility of the witnesses but also because 
it has developed expertise by its constant concern with 
a particular subject matter. 
In the instant case, however, there is no "finding" 
of blindness. The findings are contained in the stipulation 
of the parties. This procedure was followed so there 
would be no question as to the nature of the function the 
Court was asked to perform. Defendant Davis's eye is 
approximately 50% efficient with glasses. vVhether that 
eye is "totally blind" or not is a pure question of statu-
tory construction, and statutory construction is the 
peculiar business of the judiciary. This point is discussed 
at smne length by the editors of American Jurisprudence 
in Section 530 of their treatise on Workmen's Compensa-
10 
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tion (58 .Atn. ,Jur. 905), and tlwy there n1ake the cate-
gorical stateinent that: 
"The legal conclusions or decisions of the 
commission or other tribunal, based upon its find-
ings of fact, are reviewable, the correctness or 
propriety thereof constituting questions of law." 
Then' is befon' this Court, then, the simple question of 
w}wtiH'r or not a n1an who can see well with glasses but 
not at all without glasses is afflicted with "total blind-
nPss" within thl' meaning of Utah's compensation act. 
'fhe ( 1om.mission 's decision in the matter is reviewable 
us a conclusion of law and need not be shown to be arbi-
trary or capricious. Since there was only dictum from 
this Court (Moray v. Commission, 58 Utah 404) to guide 
the Commission, this matter was referred on stipulation 
so that this Court could clearly announce the controlling 
doctrine in a proceeding where only a question of law 
was posed. 
POINT III 
THE STATEMENT IN THE DECISION TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE LEGISLATURE, BY MERELY 
PROVIDING A SPECIFIC AWARD FOR "'TOTAL 
BLINDNESS," EXPRESSED AN INTENTION THAT 
CORRECTIBLE AND UNCORRECTIBLE IMP AIR-
MENT OF VISION SHOULD BE DEEMED EQUAL-
LY DISABLING IS CONTRARY TO COMMON 
SENSE AND COMMON UNDERSTANDING. 
"'" e believe the Court has erred in holding, against 
its previous dictu1n, that eye impairn1ent should be evalu-
ated on an uncorrected basis. Webster says a man is blind 
11 
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when he is "destitute of the :)Ci!:)C of seeing.m Destitute 
1neans "devoid," and "devoid, void and destitute agree 
in the idea of entire want or lack.m Sense is defined as 
"the faculty of receiving Inental impressions through the 
actions of certain organs." 3 We submit that it is error 
to conclude that a man who can receive sharp mental im-
pressions through the action of his eye by merely holding 
a piece of glass before it is "totally blind." If there is one 
thing that "everyone knows" about blindness, it is that 
people who see well but only with glasses are not blind. 
The inequities which the Court's decision of March 
6 would propagate are as obvious as they are unneces-
sary. As instances, we cite these: 
1. A workman who cannot see without glasses 
but sees perfectly with them will have sustained no 
compensable functional loss if he later really and 
truly loses his sense of sight by industrial accident. 
2. A workman whose injury results in a sight 
i1npairment such that he cannot see without glasses 
but sees perfectly with them must be deemed perma-
nently and totally disabled. There is a conclusive 
statutory presumption of such disability. 
Workmen's compensation is a liability-without-fault 
system designed to restore earnings and give recompense 
for earning power lost by reason of industrial accident. 
1. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English 
Language, G & C Merriam Company, 1925. 
2. Ibid (page 611) 
3. Ibid. 
12 
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Tht> ~yste1n is contorted out of recognition by the adop-
tion of a doctrine which would, on the one hand, require 
<·omptansation to be paid for life to a person who has no 
disability at all (the worknmn whose industrially caused 
hlindnP~H i~ fully correctible) and, on the other hand, 
n•quire the denial of any benefits to a. person who be-
comP~ totally disabled from industrial accident (the work 
man whose congenital eye defect is fully corrected by 
glaH~P~ until an industrial accident robs him of the 
faculty of sight in the true sense). 
These absurd results are entirely avoided by adopt-
ing what is the prevailing doctrine in this country either 
by judicial or legislative construction. Visual impair-
ment should be evaluated on a corrected basis with due 
n'gard to the inconvenience, if any, of wearing glasses. 
In its ~larch 6 decision, the Court says the Utah pro-
,·ision is ainong the n1ost favorable to allowing a corn-
plete award even though substantial restoration of func-
tion is easily effected. Section 35-1-66 U.C.A. is, in fact, 
typical of the con1pensation acts throughout the country 
(although son1e legislatures have belatedly made certain 
that eye evaluation will be done on a corrected basis). 
The language of our act does not compel either a narrow 
or a broad construction. 
Further, the 1\tfarch 6 opinion expresses the notion 
that the legislature could, had it so intended, have pro-
vided one schedule for blindness which is correctible and 
another ~chedule for blindness which is not. We submit 
that the legislature's failure to do so (since it is mani-
13 
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festly ridiculous to cornpensate a man whose sight can 
easily be restored equally with a rnan whose sight cannot 
be restored) rnerely demonstrates a legislative recogni-
tion of the popular concept that a u1an who can see with 
glasses is not blind and a legislative assurnption that the 
act would be administered in accordance with that con-
cept. There is no such thing as '' correctible total blind-
ness.'' The phrase is a contradiction in terms. 
CONCLU8ION 
For the reasons above stated, we respectfully request 
that the Court reconsider its decision of March 6, grant 
rehearing and enter its order voiding the Commission's 
award for total blindness. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, ~1ECHAM & PRATT 
By: Frank J. Allen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
14 
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